economic unit consists of several persons, natural of legal.""complex concept involving human and physical components joined in the pursuit of a single economic activity …".
12
These definitions and characteristics immediately indicate that it may not always be easy to identify an undertaking and its boundaries and, consequently, whether one, or more, undertaking exists and whether it/they are acting unilaterally or jointly for the purposes of the competition law rules. 13 For example, a company or partnership may be made up of individuals capable of competing with one another, a principal and an agent or members of the same corporate group (a parent and its subsidiaries) may constitute separate legal entities but the question of whether they each constitute distinct undertakings or form part of the same economic unit is critical to the issue of whether or not Article 101 applies to agreements between them.
Similarly a joint venture ("JV"), 14 created structurally as a separate entity to its parents, could be viewed as a single economic unit together with its parents or as a separate undertaking which operates in collaboration with its parents. 15 If the JV and its parents are viewed as a single economic actor its unilateral actions will infringe EU competition law only if it is dominant and it commits an abuse. Case T-6/89, Enichem v Commission [1991] ECR II-1623, paras 233-235. 13 The relationship between the "economic activity" and "economic unit" requirements is also not clear. In particular, it is unclear whether an entity engaged in economic activity is the critical factor to determining the scope of the economic unit (see e.g., the discussion of employment and agency relationships below) or whether an entity engaged in economic activity may not constitute an undertaking if it forms part of a larger economic unit.
14 The term JV can be used to describe a wide spectrum of commercial arrangements between firms. In competition law, it is frequently used to describe an entity which (i) constitutes a separate business entity, and (ii) is jointly controlled by at least two parents.
between the JV and its parents may constitute intra-undertaking agreements falling outside the scope of Article 101(1). If, in contrast, the JV is viewed as a collaboration of its parents, much of its conduct, including its purchasing, pricing and output decisions (as well as its contractual arrangements with its parents (and between the parents)), will be open to examination and analysed rigorously as joint conduct under Article 101.
An important challenge for the EU competition law system is, therefore, to ensure that the parameters of an undertaking are clearly defined so that an unequivocal line can be drawn between concerted conduct falling within the scope of Article 101 and unilateral conduct falling outside of it. In drawing such boundaries it is critical that sight is not lost of this important consequence -that joint conduct of entities within the economic unit is treated as unilateral and so is per se legal under
Article 101. The doctrine thus needs to be realistically and carefully confined so as to ensure that potentially anti-competitive arrangements between firms do not escape scrutiny under the competition law rules. The discussion in this paper indicates that, despite its significance, the question of how broadly the boundaries of an economic unit and a single undertaking extend is not clearly resolved in EU competition law.
Rather, the interpretation given to the concept has been developed incrementally in two main strands of jurisprudence which are arguably underpinned by different policy objectives -one dealing with the "substantive reach" of Article 101 and the question of whether the conduct of two or more entities is characterized as joint or unilateral and the other dealing with the question of whether liability for a competition law infringement committed by one entity can be imposed on, or attributed to, another entity within the corporate group/economic unit ("attribution of liability" cases). Not only may this fact have led to the interpretation of the concept being developed in one line of cases without full regard being taken for the consequences in the other, but it may have resulted in an over-expansive interpretation being adopted and some inconsistencies and conflicts arising, making a coherent answer to the question of what is an undertaking?, hard to discern.
Although a number of commentators have recently been railing against the economic unit being used as a broad mechanism for attributing liability for
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2131740
sought to analyse the question of what constitutes an economic unit, and its relevance to all the EU competition law rules, more generally. 17 This article also seeks to determine the boundaries of an undertaking in EU competition law more broadly, taking account of some important recent developments in the case-law.
It commences in Part B by examining some of the core cases which establish how the notion of an undertaking is applied to natural persons, legal persons, and groups of persons (such as principal and agent, parent and subsidiaries and parents and JV) and seeks to clarify the principles and policy underpinning and influencing them. In Part C the implications of the case-law are assessed and it is considered both whether the cases support the view that there is a single concept of an undertaking which applies throughout EU competition law and/or whether such an approach is desirable. In the light of this and, in particular the policy objectives underpinning the economic unit doctrine, Part D discusses whether there is a need for a more holistic approach to be taken to the concept of an undertaking, requiring some reconsideration of, and retrenchment in, the case-law.
B. IDENTIFYING AN ECONOMIC UNIT AND ITS BOUNDARIES

Natural persons, legal persons and groups of persons
It is well-established that an undertaking may range from a single individual to two or more companies within a corporate group, i.e., it may comprise natural persons, legal 813, 818 ("[t] he lines between firms, cartels and joint ventures are notoriously indistinct"). In the work for and under the direction of their employers, were to be viewed as being incorporated into the undertaking concerned and forming part of the "economic unit".
23
Although a decision to equate the term undertaking with natural or legal personality under national law would have provided some legal certainty and made the identification of an undertaking in EU competition law relatively simple, it has been seen that this is not the approach which has been adopted. On the contrary, it is clear that one or more legal persons designating an economic unit can constitute a single undertaking. For example, the close economic links which exist in many relationships between principal and agent have led the Court of Justice ("CJ") to recognise that an independently owned agent may lose its character as an independent trader and operate as an auxiliary organ "forming an integral part of the principal's undertaking" 24 where the agent does not take on any (or only a negligible portion of) financial and commercial risk linked to sales of goods to third parties on behalf of the principal (even it seems if the agent acts for more than one principal). 25 Like the employee, therefore, the agent who does not accept the risk of the principal's business, seems to be viewed not as an entity engaged in economic activity but as incorporated within the undertaking, providing services for and at the direction of the principal. Reflecting the functional approach taken to the concept of undertaking, however, the CJ had held that it only with regard to the market on which the agent US, for example, partners, officers and employees of partnerships are also treated as constituent elements of a whole, see e.g. Devlin and Jacobs (n 15). [1966] ECR 299 (where the CJ rejected the argument that a vertical agreement did not constitute an agreement between undertakings as the supplier and distributor were not on an equal footing and were not competitors and distinguished this situation from that in which a producer includes within his undertaking the distribution of his own products by some means, e.g., through a commercial representative, "These situations are distinct in law and, moreover, need to be assessed differently, since two marketing organisations, one of which is integrated into the manufacturer's undertaking while the other is not, may not necessarily have the same efficiency", 340).
offers its principal's goods or services to potential customers that the agent is regarded as an auxiliary part of the principal's business. In contrast, the agent is normally regarded as an independent operator and undertaking with regard to the market on which it offers its agency services to potential principals.
26
The CJ has also held that, in the context of parent-subsidiary relationships, entities will constitute a single economic unit if a subsidiary "enjoys no economic independence" 27 or if the entities "form an economic unit within which the subsidiary has no real freedom to determine its course of action on the market" 28 but carries out the instructions issued by the parent company controlling them. Case 170/83 (n 11).
32
See also n 11 and accompanying text. The terminology used in this case is rather confusing however as the judgment also refers to the partnership and the firm as undertakings and so concludes that the block exemption regulation can be applied "even if several legally independent undertakings participate in the agreement as one contracting party provided that those undertakings constitute an economic unit for the purposes of the agreement", para 12. This seems to suggest that Although the rationale underpinning these judgments has not been made explicit, Case 170/83 (n 11), para 11, but see also n 24.
34
For an interesting discussion of the cases dealing with this issue and the principles underpinning them see Lenz AG in Case C-73/95 P, Viho (n 30), paras 31-73, especially para 67.
35
Case T-102/92, Viho (n 32), para 50.
36 467 US 752, 769, 767-772 (1984 Commission's policy in many cartel infringement cases is now, wherever possible, to attribute liability to parent companies. This policy maximizes the total level of fines both by augmenting the maximum cap on the level of fines which can be imposed (which is 10% of the turnover of the undertaking as a whole 39 ) and by enhancing the risk of a finding of recidivism, a deterrence uplift and civil damages' claims.
40
The application of the doctrine in this way has proved controversial, prompting some to complain that such a use is unconvincing, illogical and breaches fundamental principles, in particular of personal responsibility and limited liability, and the presumption of innocence. 41 Nonetheless, the EU courts have, to date, generally affirmed the Commission's approach adhering to the view that as the "parent company and its subsidiary form a single economic unit and therefore a single undertaking" a decision imposing fines can be addressed "to the parent company, without having to establish the personal involvement of the latter in the infringement." 42 Responsibility for the competition law infringement falls to the undertaking/ economic unit as a whole.
43
The greater volume of cases decided in this area shed light on the question of how, in this context at least, it is determined whether or not the subsidiary and parent constitute part of the same economic unit. 44 The key issue identified in the cases is whether the parent is able to, and does, exercise decisive influence over the policy and direct the conduct of its subsidiary, so that the subsidiary does not enjoy real autonomy or independence in determining its course of action in the market.
45
Critically, the cases establish that (i) where a parent holds a 100% shareholding in a 39 See nn 37 and 126.
40
The Commission has discretion as to whether to hold the parent jointly and severally liable with the corporate entity directly involved in the infringement. To maximise the deterrent effect of fines, the Commission's "invariable policy today is to hold a group parent automatically responsible for cartel infringements committed down the line by its wholly owned subsidiaries." Joshua, Botteman & Atlee (n 16), 3-4.
41
See e.g., articles cited in n 16, Ooms Avenhorn Holding BV v The Netherlands appl no 40490/11 (appeal to the European Court of Human Rights) and further sections C and D.
42
Akzo Nobel (n 11), paras 58-59.
43
"The parent's awareness of, still less its participation in, the subsidiaries' wrongdoing has nothing to do with it. The acid test is whether together they compose one and the same undertaking": Joshua, Botteman & Atlee (n 16), 3.
44
See nn 27&28 above.
45
Dyestuffs (n 38), paras 125-146.
subsidiary, or a de minimis amount less than 100%,the parent does in fact exercise decisive influence over the commercial policy and conduct of its subsidiary applies; 47 and (ii) the exercise of decisive influence can be ascertained in other situations "on the basis of a body of factual evidence, including, in particular, any management power exercised by the parent company or companies over their subsidiary".
48
b.
Defining control and decisive influence
The concepts of control and decisive influence utilized in the cases are also concepts that are used in EUMR to determine whether a "concentration" (or merger) occurs.
The term concentration catches mergers between independent undertakings and changes in, or acquisitions of, control of an undertaking -that is situations where one or more undertakings acquire control (sole or joint) of the whole or part of one or more other undertakings through the acquisition of rights which confer the possibility of exercising decisive influence on that other (most commonly from the acquisition of shares). 49 Control and decisive influence in the EUMR context has been interpreted broadly to include sole or joint control acquired on a de jure or de facto basis. Positive (sole) control is acquired where an undertaking acquires rights which allow it to determine the strategic direction of another undertaking. Negative control arises where rights acquired allow the rights holder to block important strategic decisions to be followed by the subsidiary but not actually to decide strategic direction. The EUMR also applies to changes in the quality of control.
which perform on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity (a "full-function' JV which is fully autonomous from an operational point of view").
51
The view could be taken that to ensure consistency and symmetry between the EU competition law provisions, the principles to be applied to determine whether a parent and its subsidiary form part of a single economic unit (and undertaking) should relate to, and be consistent with, those which apply when determining whether there is a concentration within the meaning of the EUMR. Wouter Wils, 52 for example, has argued that to ensure a coherent competition policy Article 101 should not apply to arrangements between companies which are linked in such a way that the links would amount to the acquisition of sole control within the meaning of the EUMR. If one firm acquires sole control over another (with the possibility of exercising decisive influence over that other) so that a concentration is considered to have occurred, that should be sufficient, if the merger is authorised, to conclude that, post-merger, the previously separate entities now operate as an integrated single undertaking. In his view, therefore, the notion of undertaking under Article 101 should coincide with, and relate to, the notion of sole control under the EUMR so that both coincide with the economic notion of the firm the distinctive characteristic of which is "the existence of authority or the power to exercise control over people and physical assets" 53 .
Although the cases dealing with the concept of undertaking in attribution of liability cases have not generally sought guidance from EUMR practice, 54 they have extended the notion of control to cover situations of both sole and joint control. ibid. Wils thus proposes a common notion of undertaking which flows through Article 101, 102 and the EUMR. The theory of the firm derives from the writing of Ronald Coase, "The Nature of the Firm" 1937 Economica vol 4 (consisting "of the system of relationships which comes into existence when the direction of resources is dependent on an entrepreneur". Resource allocation within a firm is not guided through prices (as in the market) but through direct managerial control. In economics therefore a firm is characterised as a single decision-taker and pursues a single goal (of profit maximisation)).
54
But see n 64 and accompanying text, Commission's Draft Horizontal Co-operation Guidelines, SEC(2010) 528/2, para 11, n 7 (although this part of the paragraph was not repeated in the final version of the guidelines).
Indeed, they indicate that conditions may be satisfied where a parent has sole positive control over its subsidiary acquired on a de jure basis, whether through a 100% Fuji Electric (n 48), para 183 (even a minority interest may enable a parent company "actually to exercise a decisive influence on its subsidiary's market conduct, if it is allied to rights greater than those normally granted to minority shareholders in order to protect their financial interest and which, when considered in the light of a set of consistent legal or economic indicia, are such as to show that a decisive influence is exercised over the subsidiary's market conduct.").
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Avebe (n 48), especially paras 138-39.
59
Avebe (n 48), para 141.
60
Fuji Electric (n 48).
concluded that the Commission had demonstrated that Fuji actually exercised a decisive influence on the market conduct of its JV, on the basis of factual evidence including management power exercised, 62 and was fully entitled to hold Fuji jointly and severally liable with the JV for the infringement. Further, in Dow the GC upheld the Commission's finding that Dow and EI Du Pont were jointly and severally liable for the infringement of their JV (the creation of which had been approved under the EUMR) and formed part of the same economic unit with it. Relying amongst other things 63 on the fact that the Commission had found that they had acquired joint control of the JV when appraising it under the EUMR, 64 the Court agreed that they had the power to jointly control their JV and further that, in the light of all the economic, legal and organizational links, control had actually been exercised. In so doing the GC specifically rejected the argument that as the parents merely exercised joint negative control they only had a right of veto over the commercial strategy of the JV and not the power to exercise decisive influence over its day-to-day management:
" For example the master agreement on the creation of the JV established that the founding companies had to agree on important decisions relating to the JV's management and business and there was considerable overlapping senior management between the parent and JV. The Commission had found that the factual record established that Hitachi and Fuji were able to exercise and have actually exercised a decisive influence with regard to the involvement of the JV in the cartel activities and that the JV did not determine autonomously its market behaviour, but followed the commercial practices and behaviour established by Hitachi and Fuji. "By transferring their GIS interests to [the JV], Hitachi and Fuji were in effect using [JV] as a vehicle to continue their long standing involvement in the cartel". 63 E.g., the fact that each had the right to participate on a Members' Committee which approved certain matters pertaining to the strategic direction of the JV, they had both withdrawn from the Chloroprene Rubber market and participated on it only through their JV. Net profits or losses of JV were allocated in equal proportions to the two parents.
over its business strategy … The 'negative' nature of the control that the applicant held over [JV] did not therefore prevent it from exercising over [JV] sufficient decisive influence to enable the Commission to impute to it the unlawful conduct of that joint venture".
65
The GC also held that the fact that the Commission had found that the JV was an autonomous full-function JV for the purposes of the EUMR 66 did not mean that it was autonomous in the sense that it was free from the exercise of decisive influence by its parent on its commercial conduct and policies. The operational autonomy required of full-function JVs under the EUMR thus does not "mean that the joint venture enjoys autonomy as regards the adoption of its strategic decisions (and that it is not therefore under the decisive influence exercised by its parent companies for the purposes of the application of Article [101])". 67 The question of whether the GC has correctly interpreted the concepts of undertaking, economic unit and decisive influence is now pending for resolution before the CJ.
Although the terms control and decisive influence have been defined broadly in these undertaking cases, they are not clearly identical to those utilized in the EUMR context. Not only do they extend to cover all jointly controlled JVs (whether or not created as an autonomous full-function JV or another JV falling within the jurisdiction of, and cleared under, the EUMR 68 ) but it is has yet to be decided if they extend, for example, to sole negative control. 69 Further, in contrast to the position under the EUMR where it is necessary only to assess whether rights to be acquired give a parent the possibility of exercising decisive influence over the subsidiary, 70 the cases have consistently stressed that such a possibility is not enough -it must also be considered whether that power has actually been exercised i.e. whether the persons on 65 Dow (n 61), para 92.
66
See further section (e) below.
67 Dow (n 61), para 93.
68
The finding of economic unity in these cases stemmed simply from the exercise by the parents of joint control and decisive influence over the conduct of the JV: its operational autonomy and the question of whether its creation had been approved under the EUMR or was consistent with Article 101 seemed to be irrelevant, see also e.g., Candle Waxes, 1 October 2008, para 481.
69
But see n 65 and accompanying text.
70
That is, its ability to control the strategic commercial behaviour of the undertaking concerned, on a de jure or de facto basis, through its shareholdings, property rights, assets, and/or through contracts and shareholders agreement, EUMR, art 3(1)(b) and (2) and Jurisdictional Notice (n 51), para 16.
whom liability is to be imposed "either directly managed that undertaking or in fact exercised control over the persons who were managing that undertaking and thereby determined their conduct on the market". 71 The extent to which this latter requirement in fact constitutes a material difference is controversial, however. In particular, in some scenarios the question of whether power has actually been exercised appears to be inferred from the potential/power to do so. For example, it has been seen that in cases where the parent owns 100%, or a de minimis amount less, of the shareholding in the subsidiary it is presumed that decisive influence has been exercised and it is uncertain whether, and if so how, that presumption can be rebutted. 72 Further, even in cases of smaller shareholdings it seems that actual decisive influence may be inferred from evidence deriving from the organisational and economic links between the entities and the potential to exercise decisive influence. Indeed, as it seems clear that actual decisive influence does not necessarily have to result from specific instructions on elements of commercial policy but can arise even when a parent does not make use of any actual rights of co-determination and refrains from giving specific instructions or guidelines on individual elements of a commercial policy 73 it appears that the power to exercise decisive influence will often be the determining factor.
C.
A SINGLE CONCEPT OF AN UNDERTAKING?
Support for a single concept of an undertaking in EU competition law
The case-law explored in section B suggests that the concept of an undertaking is a relatively broad one centred on the notion of control and encompassing:
(a) Natural persons;
(b) Persons bound together by a contractual relationship which results in one person working for and under the direction of another and so being integrated within that 71 "It must be pointed out in that regard that, according to that case-law and contrary to the Commission's assertions …, the Commission cannot merely find that an undertaking "was able to" exert such a decisive influence over the other undertaking, without checking whether that influence actually was exerted. On the contrary, it follows from that case-law that it is, in principle, for the Commission to demonstrate such decisive influence on the basis of factual evidence, including, in particular, any management power one of the undertakings may have over the other …" Avebe (n 48 above), para 136.
72
See Joshua, Botteman & Atlee (n 43) and ArcelorMittal (n 47), Bot AG.
73
See eg Akzo Nobel (n 11), para 73, Kokott AG, paras 89-93 and Dow (n 61), paras 77, 81 and 101. This has led some firms to complain that the rules in this area breach the presumption of innocence from which they benefit in EU competition law.
other (for example, an employment or agency contract) or one person controlling the behaviour of another; 74 (c) A parent and a subsidiary, where the latter has no freedom to determine its course of action or economic independence as the parent has sufficient rights to exercise, and does actually exercise, positive control over its behaviour (for example, where the parent owns 100% in the share capital in the subsidiary, a majority interest which enables it actually to exercise a decisive influence on its subsidiary or a minority interest which enables it to exercise a decisive influence on its subsidiary's market conduct, because it is allied to rights greater than those normally granted to minority shareholders);
(d) (Possibly) a parent and a subsidiary, where the latter has sufficient rights to veto strategic decisions of the latter, and actually exercises such negative control over its behaviour;
(e) A parent and all subsidiaries which are controlled (within the meaning of (c) or (d) above) by the same parent;
(f) A JV and parents who have the power to, and do actually, exercise jointly control and decisive influence over the JV's behaviour.
A majority of the case-law in this area has, however, arisen in in context of proceedings relating to the attribution of liability to parents for the behaviour of their
subsidiaries. An essential issue, therefore, is whether the notion of an undertaking is the same in all contexts and, in particular, whether the principles developed in the "attribution of liability" cases can be read across and applied to a situation where the matter at issue is the "substantive reach" of Article 101 (and vice versa)?
Although it will be seen that a strong argument could be made that there should be a context-specific approach to the concept of an undertaking, 75 the cases do 74 See e.g., Jurisdictional Notice (n 51), para 20 (suggesting that for the purposes of the EUMR certain contractual relationships may be sufficient to give one undertaking control over anothere.g. a long term supply agreement leading to a position of economic dependence, but not a franchising arrangement). See also the Commission's decision in Bananas where the Commission found that the combination of a partnership and distribution agreement was sufficient to give Del Monte the possibility to exercise decisive influence on the way Weichart ran its business and that Del Monte did exercise such influence, paras 383-385.
75
In e.g., Singapore, the Competition Commission has held that two entities may not form a single economic entity in one context (e.g. where the issues is whether agreements between the entities should be excluded from its prohibition of anticompetitive agreements) even though they may do generally suggest that the principles apply to both situations without distinction.
76
First, the cases all hinge on the interpretation of the term "undertaking", without any suggestion that the concept should be considered differently in differing scenarios. Viho (n 30) para 16. In Case T-102/92, Viho (n 32) the GC also relied on cases concerning parental liability in its judgment upholding the Commission's conclusion that agreements between Parker Pen and its subsidiaries fell outside of Article 101(1). Indeed it concluded that the Commission had been correct in finding that because the subsidiaries' conduct could be imputed to the parent that the integrated distribution system fell outside of Article 101.
81
See ArcelorMittal (n 47), Bot AG, para 178 (the concept of undertaking "has the consequence of excluding the application of Article 101(1) TFEU to agreements between a subsidiary and its parent company, since there is no agreement 'between undertakings'" and of allowing the conduct of a subsidiary to be attributed to a parent where the latter does not determine its market behaviour autonomously). The cases do therefore provide considerable support for the view that a single concept of an undertaking exists for competition law purposes and, consequently that, in line with the attribution of liability cases, the following conduct is to be characterised as unilateral and not the joint conduct of two or more undertakings: agreements between a parent and subsidiary (where the former exercises decisive influence over the behaviour of the latter); agreements between sister companies; 84 and the conduct and operation of a JV where the latter forms "part of one undertaking with each of the parent companies that jointly exercise decisive influence and effective control over it". 85 Because of the functional approach taken to the concept of an undertaking, however, it would seem that any exclusion of conduct from Article 101 would be dependent upon the conduct at issue relating to the internal working of, or the internal allocation of responsibilities within, the economic unit. 86 In the context of a JV, this would suggest that only conduct inherent to the working and operation of the JV falls outside of Article 101. 87 The conduct of the JV, when acting within its scope, would thus be regarded as the conduct of a single entity and Article 101 should not apply "to agreements between the parent and such a joint venture … Article 101 could, however, apply to agreements between the parents outside the scope of the joint venture". 88 In these substantive reach cases, therefore, it may be that the question 83 Akzo Nobel (n 11), paras 72-78. 84 Commission, Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C11/1, para 11 ("Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines") ("the same is true for sister companies, that is to say companies over which decisive influence is exercised by the same parent company. They are consequently not considered to be competitors even if they are both active on the same relevant product and geographic markets.") 85 Draft Horizontal Co-operation Guidelines, (n 54), para 11 (this part of the paragraph was not repeated in the final version of the Guidelines, however This of course leaves a difficult line to be drawn between conduct relating to the working of the economic unit (exempted from Article 101) and that which goes beyond it (falling within Article 101). Unilateral conduct could be caught by Art 102, however.
88
"and with regard to the agreement between the parents to create the joint venture", Draft Horizontal Co-operation Guidelines, (n 54), para 11 (this part of the paragraph was not repeated in the final version of the Guidelines, however).
of whether the entities are acting as a single undertaking will turn on the complex question of whether the conduct limits competition among the parents and the JV outside of its core operations. The breadth of the principle expounded
Although recognition of a single concept of an undertaking in EU competition law would provide greatest coherence to the system, a number of concerns potentially result from the conclusion that the notion of an undertaking, at least as it has currently been defined, is the same in each line of cases. Not only do the attribution of liability cases seem to push the concept to a broad limit without specific reference to the underlying objectives of the doctrine or to its consequences for the reach and scope of Article 101, but the interpretation given in some of these cases is difficult to reconcile with other strands of jurisprudence and legislation.
b. Do the principles underlying the single economic unit doctrine in each line of cases dictate different outcomes?
It has been seen that in cases dealing with the substantive reach of Article 101, the policy appears to be to take outside of Article 101 arrangements which resemble the internal workings of a firm or arrangements between entities which are in any event bound to pursue a common policy on the market. In attribution of liability cases, however, the policy seems rather different. In the absence of exceptional circumstances, many legal systems are reluctant to look behind corporate personality
See further n 134 and accompanying text and e.g. the view of the US government, 'Brief for the United States and Amicus Curiae Supporting the Petitioner: American Needle,' <http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f250300/250316.htm> pt 2, (a JV's conduct could be unilateral under the antitrust laws if: (1) the parents had effectively merged the relevant aspect of their operations in a specific sphere (thereby eliminating actual and potential competition among the parents and between the parents and the JV in that operational sphere); and (2) the challenged restraint did not significantly affect actual or potential competition among the parents or between the parents and the JV outside their merged operations).
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In England & Wales, for example, " [t] here is no general principle that all companies in a group are to be regarded as one. On the contrary, the fundamental principle is that each company in a group of companies (a relatively modern concept) is a separate legal entity possessed of separate rights and liabilities" Adams v Cape Industries [1990] Akzo Nobel (n 11), Kokott AG, para 38 ("[i]n selecting criteria for attributing offences, both the sanctionative nature of the measures imposed and their purpose must be taken into account").
92
For the view that the economic unit principle was transplanted uncritically into the law governing fines, see e.g., Hofstetter & Ludescher (n 16) ("Ignoring the fundamental concept of limited liability for subsidiary corporations, the Commission seems to espouse a system of 'guilt by association' which, to be sure, lacks a sound basis in EU antitrust law. The legal entry door used by the Commission is the -misinterpreted -construct of the corporate group as an "undertaking").
93
Given the nature of competition law infringements "and the nature and degree of severity of the ensuing penalties, responsibility for committing those infringements is personal in nature", Case C-49/92, Commission v Anic Partecipazioni SpA [1999] ECR I-04125, para 78.
For the view that antitrust fines should primarily be aimed at deterrence and therefore be based on fault, see Hofstetter & Ludescher (n 16) ("Absent any direct involvement in the antitrust violations of the top representatives of a corporation, fault on the part of the company should be defined as a deficiency in its compliance organisation").
directly in the infringement, it exercises, in such a case, a decisive influence over the subsidiaries which have participated in it".
95
This suggests that even though it is important that the parent and subsidiary are part of the same undertaking, this factor alone is not, or should not be, sufficient to impose liability -rather some fault or responsibility on the part of the parent is required. For example, the Commission has never sought to impute liability to a subsidiary for the conduct of its parent or to one sister corporation for the conduct of another (even if they can all be said to form part of the same economic unit). Rather, liability for an infringement by an entity within the economic unit is only imputed upwards to another entity which controls the behaviour of, or exercises decisive influence over, the entity in breach. In substantive reach cases, in contrast, the hierarchical relationship is not important. Rather, the doctrine can exclude arrangements both between sister corporations and arrangements between a parent and a subsidiary.
96
The requirement for personal responsibility on the part of the parent might also explain the condition set out in the cases that the parent must "actually" have exercised decisive influence of its subsidiary, and that the power to do so is not enough. Although evidence of actual exercise seems justifiable, and arguably essential, in this context, 97 it is questionable whether such evidence should be necessary in substantive reach cases where the issue is simply whether the entities at issue operate unilaterally as a single economic entity rather than jointly. In determining whether a parent and subsidiary would be likely to adopt a common course of conduct on the market it would seem important to focus only on the question of whether the parent has the potential to exercise control over the conduct of its subsidiary: even if the subsidiary does not act in the best interest of the parent, the 95 Akzo Nobel (n 11), para 77: "In accordance with the principle of personal liability … under which a person can be held liable only for his own acts …, it falls, in principle, to the person managing the undertaking when the infringement was committed to answer for that infringement"; Case This could be because in each case the conduct of the subsidiary is treated as the conduct of, and imputed to, the parent, see n 80 above.
97
For the view that a presumption of parental liability for subsidiary conduct breaches fundamental principles of EU law, see authorities cited in n 16.
latter can always take full control and ensure that it does.
actual exercise of control in substantive reach cases would thus seem to render "the legality of agreements between companies under the same control" dependent "on whether the agreement could be established to have been centrally ordered by the parent company" without serving "any intelligible competition policy objective".
99
Conversely, it could also be argued that the notion of an undertaking might have a more expansive role to play in attribution of liability cases. For example, it has been seen that the Commission seeks where possible to attribute liability to parent companies in order to maximize the deterrent effect of the fines it imposes. This policy has driven the Commission to push the concept more broadly and to use it to impute liability to parents which jointly control the behaviour of a JV. Although this use of the doctrine and its extension is in itself extremely contentious, in Dow the GC confirmed that negative control and the power to prevent the infringing behaviour of a subsidiary or JV might in certain circumstances be sufficient to constitute control. The CJ's view on this matter is now awaited. Even if this view were to be upheld by the CJ, it is questionable whether negative control should be sufficient to ensure that the parent and subsidiary pursue a common course of conduct -the rationale for excluding the application of Article 101 in substantive reach cases. Further, application of such a far-reaching concept of an undertaking extending, in particular to JVs, raises concern that the conduct of an entity controlled by a group of competitors, and used as a vehicle for cooperation between them, may escape Article 101 scrutiny and is difficult to reconcile with earlier precedent dealing specifically with the substantive reach of Article 101 and the treatment of JVs under it.
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Such an interpretation could avoid the rather circular situation where e.g., a contract could constitute a relevant factor in the assessment of whether the parent is actually exercising decisive influence over the subsidiary (and hence the determination of whether the agreement falls outside Article 101). If the parent has the possibility of exercising decisive influence and controlling the subsidiary's conduct, it can exercise control irrespective of the agreement, see n 36 and accompanying text 99 Wils (n 17), 107. As Wils points out, however, the case-law dealing with the substantive reach of Article 101 is ambiguous on this point. Some early cases do not seem to require more than the potential to exercise decisive influence, others seems to suggest that actual exercise might be necessary.
In Centafarm the CJ held that only agreements between entities belonging to the "same concern" 100 were excluded from Article 101. In line with this wording, the Commission seemed initially to have eschewed the idea that a JV and its parents form part of a single economic unit. In IJsselcentrale, 101 for example, the Commission decided that a JV and its parent companies could not constitute a single economic unit as the behaviour of the firms within the group was not controlled by a single firm (they were not all part of the same concern): rather the behaviour of each parent was controlled independently. It thus rejected an argument that a cooperation agreement concluded between SEP, a company set up by four electricity generating companies as a vehicle for cooperation between them, and its parent companies fell outside of Article 101 on the grounds that the participating electricity generators together formed an economic unit, the components in "one indivisible public electricity supply system." 102 Rather, it held that the four companies did not belong to a single group of members. In line with this approach the Commission held in Rubber Chemicalsa JV, Flexys, did not constitute a single entity with the two parents that jointly controlled it. On the contrary, it held that as the creation of the JV had been approved by the Commission under the EUMR, the parents had withdrawn from the JV's market, neither parent had sole control over the JV and the JV could be presumed to be autonomous from its parents. Consequently, it "can be presumed to constitute a separate undertaking with respect to its parents".
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These decisions reflect a more cautious approach to the concept of an undertaking and a reluctance to accept that cooperation through a JV should automatically escape antitrust scrutiny under Article 101. Indeed, as a core objective of Article 101 is to allow the detection, condemnation and elimination of "naked" cartel activity, 108 it seems important, in the context of JVs, to ensure that competitors are not able to manipulate business structures in a way which allows them to put unlawful coordination between them beyond the reach of the antitrust rules: entities should not be able to evade the rules on competition on account simply of the form in which they coordinate their conduct. To ensure that this principle is effective Article 123 It has already been seen that this latter requirement appears essential in order to ensure that a swath of conduct which raises the antitrust dangers that Article 101 is designed to police is not to be carved out from it and a range of potentially exclusionary and collusive behaviour allowed to go unchecked.
Other Factors which add to a lack of clarity
a. Terminology
In a number of situations terminology is, or has been, used which confuses further the picture of what constitutes an undertaking. For example, in a number of earlier cases, the language adopted by the EU Courts appears to suggest that an economic unit is made up of "undertakings" and so is something distinct from the undertaking/persons of which it comprises. 124 More frequently, however, the judgments have emphasized the more traditionally accepted view that "the concept of an undertaking … must be understood as designating an economic unit even if in law that economic unit consists of several persons, natural or legal". 125 Those persons do not therefore themselves constitute undertakings but form part of the larger undertaking as a whole. In line with this latter view, the term "undertaking" in Regulation 1/2003, for instance, is interpreted as referring to the economic unit as a whole, allowing decisions to be addressed to legal entities which form part of the infringing undertaking (even if they
were not directly involved in the infringement) and permitting fines to be imposed up to the statutory maximum of 10% of the total turnover in the preceding year of business of each economic unit involved in the infringement.
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In other Regulations and Notices, however, a different approach is sometimes adopted. For example, the block exemption for vertical agreements and the Commission's Notice on Agreements, apply to certain agreements between two or more undertakings. In each case, however, it is clarified that the term "undertaking"
shall include the undertaking's respective "connected undertakings". Connected undertakings are defined to include, for example, "undertakings" in which a party to the agreement, directly or indirectly, has the power to exercise more than half the voting rights, or has the power to appoint more than half of the supervisory board, management or has the right to manage the undertaking's affairs. 127 Clearly these connected undertakings will, in most cases, be found to form part of the same economic unit/ undertaking as the party to the agreement. It does not seem correct, therefore, to use the terms "undertakings" or "connected undertakings" in this way.
Although it is understood that definition is designed to provide legal certainty in the competition in the common market, 128 the EUMR provides specifically that in calculating the turnover of the "undertakings concerned" for the purposes of determining Community dimension, the respective turnover shall be added together of the undertakings concerned and a number of entities including, for example, those undertakings in which the undertaking concerned, directly or indirectly either owns more than half the capital or business assets, or has the power to exercise more than half the voting rights etc. 129 Again, although this need for legal certainty is understood, the use of the term undertaking in this context and the way it is defined causes confusion as it suggests an approach to the concept of undertaking which is not evidently consistent with the notion as defined by the EU Courts.
b. Can an entity act jointly and unilaterally at the same time?
A further conceptual difficulty, and a particular feature perhaps of Article 101 which applies both to undertakings and associations of undertakings, is that some case-law suggests that an entity can be found to be acting both jointly with its parents/members and unilaterally as a single undertaking at the same time. 
D. THE NEED FOR A REFINED APPROACH?
It has been seen that the interpretation of the notion of an undertaking as an economic unit has evolved in a series of cases arising in different contexts over a lengthy period of time. It has also been seen that, partly perhaps as a result of this piecemeal approach, it is not now easy to pull all of the strands of jurisprudence together and to reconcile the interpretation given to the concept of an undertaking in all cases, decisions, regulations and notices. It appears, therefore, to be an appropriate moment to take a step back and to look at the practice and approach to the term undertaking 133 in its totality and for a more holistic approach to be taken to the concept in the future.
Indeed, the appeals pending before the CJ in the Dow and du Pont cases may provide the CJ with an opportunity to consider some of these matters.
A first issue which needs to be addressed is whether the notion of undertaking is in fact the same for both "substantive reach" and "attribution of liability" cases. It has been that the objectives underpinning the two strands of cases might suggest different models. In the most recent parental liability cases, for example, the EU Courts have upheld the Commission's view that it appropriate to extend the concept of an undertaking to include parents and their JV where the parents control, the JV's behaviour and are able to prevent violations by it. In so doing they have rejected arguments that attributing liability to parents in this way breaches fundamental 132 Case C-429/08, Murphy (n 131). 133 And possibly also to the term association of undertakings.
principles, such as the principle of personal responsibility. The breadth of these rulings is contentious and the principles set out in these cases are yet to be affirmed by the CJ. Further, these cases have not had to deal explicitly with the additional question of whether the entities are sufficiently closely linked that competition between them cannot be expected, so that their unity of purpose rules out the need to apply Article 101 to agreements between them. Although early cases such as Hydrotherm and Viho might support the view that firms may form an economic unit where one has positive control over another and the power to decisively influence that other's strategic behaviour, it would be interesting to have an EU Court specifically address the policy question of whether power to exercise negative control is sufficient to establish decisive influence in this context and, particularly, whether, and if so when, the conduct of a JV should be excluded from scrutiny under Article 101.
Although the logic behind adopting a context-specific approach is understood, a single concept of an undertaking, which applies throughout EU competition, would provide greater clarity and coherence to the system. Further, it appears to be approach supported by jurisprudence. If there is to be a single concept of an undertaking, further issues to be decided are whether some rationalization or refinement of the concept of undertaking/economic unit is required to make it consistent with the policy underlying it and whether the same general concept can be applied in slightly nuanced ways in the different contexts in which it is utilized. These questions may require consideration of a number of issues including, for example: whether or not the concept of control in undertaking cases should be aligned with the concept of control under the EUMR and/or whether, and if so when, the economic unit extends to relationships of negative control and JVs; whether the actual, or potential, exercise of control should be the seminal factor; and the relevance of the conduct engaged in by the entities. In considering any modifications, it should be ensured that the concept is defined with sufficient precision to allow firms, competition agencies and courts to determine with some certainty whether or not a group of entities constitute a single undertaking and that it is, in so far as is possible, reconcilable with all the jurisprudence in this area.
The clearest and perhaps simplest solution might at first sight appear to be to align the concept of "control" and "decisive influence" in undertaking and EUMR cases, accepting that if one firm has sufficient control over another that they should be
considered to have merged that they should thereafter be treated as a single undertaking. The discussion in this paper has established that the attribution of liability jurisprudence has come fairly close to accepting this proposition, placing increasing weight to the question of whether a parent has the power to exercise decisive influence over the behaviour of its subsidiary, accepting that joint control is sufficient to establish decisive influence and, for the first time (in Dow), relying on a finding of control for the purposes of an EUMR decision to reinforce a finding that sufficient control existed to uphold a single economic unit finding.
A concern with such a solution, however, is that the extension of the concept of an undertaking so broadly, and especially to situations of negative and joint control, expands the concept considerably and perhaps beyond the objectives underpinning the notion. Further, such an approach might become excessively complicated and hard to administer. For example, in order to ensure that not too expansive a range of conduct, in particular, of a JV and its parents, is excluded from the ambit of Article 101(1), it has been emphasized that it would be essential to ensure that the economic unit only encompasses legitimately created JVs where the JV and/or parents are acting within its scope or core activities. If this is correct, then in JV cases the question of whether a JV and its parents form an economic unit will rest on the complex issues of whether the JV was legitimately created initially and whether the conduct at issue is inherent to the working and operation of the JV. Clearly, such an approach would be "factintensive", provide firms with "precious little predictability about their potential liability" and is likely to result in complex debate about what conduct can be said to be inherent to, or part of the core activity of, the JV.
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The better approach, therefore, may be to accept a narrower theory of an economic unit confining it to parent/ subsidiary relationships where the former has sole control over the latter and the power to control positively the subsidiary's strategic behaviour on the market. 135 Arguably, such an approach 136 fits better with 134 Devlin and Jacobs (n 15), 12-13 ("The 'core' must, however, have a logical limit, since without one the concept of a 'core activity' would break loose from its moorings and encompass clearly unlawful conduct … Since the core-activity inquiry cannot be tethered to an identifiable, objective metric … we believe that a venture's 'core activity' should not enjoy independent force as a substantive concept"). 135 Even if such an approach were adopted the Commission might still indirectly be able to hold parents responsible for the behaviour of an entity characterised as an association of undertakings. In particular, Reg 1/2203, art 23(2) (4) allows for fines to be imposed on an association of the policy supporting the doctrine and is easier to reconcile with jurisprudence dealing with the application of Article 101 to the conduct of JVs, with associations of undertakings and with the Commission's interpretation of the EUMR. Although such a proposal would bring the conduct of a legitimately created JV within the scope of Article 101, sight must not be lost of the fact that such conduct is simply subject to scrutiny under Article 101 -it is not necessarily prohibited by it. Clearly, Article 101
should not nullify or prohibit the buying, pricing and other commercial decisions that are inherent to the operation of a legitimately created and lawful JV. 137 Rather, the conduct of the JV is to be analysed in the legal and economic context in which it occurs, including the legitimate goals and objectives pursued by the JV.
If such an approach were to be adopted, another issue to determined would be whether proof of power to exercise sole control should be sufficient or whether actual exercise of control or something further should be required. One solution would be to accept that the general rule should be that the power to control is sufficient, but that in attribution of liability cases actual control is required in order to ensure that the imposition of liability on a parent is compatible with fundamental principles such as personal responsibility, the presumption of innocence and limited liability. The EU authorities should not therefore pierce the corporate veil and impose liability on another entity within the economic unit unless it can be said to be at fault in some way and/or to have some responsibility for the infringing behaviour. Where the notion is to turn on the potential or power to exercise sole control then useful guidance on the issue could be derived from EUMR practice. In cases where actual exercise of control is required, however, further and more explicit guidance from the EU Courts would be helpful on the policy supporting the principle of parental liability, 138 exactly what is undertakings and provides that where the infringement relates to the activities of its members the fine can amount to 10% of the sum of the total turnover of each member's activity on the market affected by the infringement. Where this occurs and, if the association is not solvent, fines can be collected from members. 136 Confining it to situations where one person not accepting risk acts for or at the direction of another and is treated as integrated within that other or where one legal person's market conduct/strategy can be positively controlled by a parent company 137 See L Ainsworth, 'American Needle -Through European Eyes' ABA Spring Meeting, March 2011, 9 for the view that such activity is covered by the EUMR clearance ("such decisions and any agreement that gave rise to them with be treated as intrinsic to the establishment of the joint venture and so covered by the EUMR clearance"). 138 And why if it is legitimate to impose liability on a legal person that forms part of the economic unit it is not legitimate to impose liability on natural persons within it, see Thomas (n 16).
required to demonstrate actual exercise of control and whether, and if so when, a finding of actual exercise of control should be able to be based on inference deriving from the power to exercise control and the distinction between the two requirements.
The case-law as it currently stands, indicating that actual decisive influence can sometimes be inferred from, for example, shareholdings or from the fact that a parent has not exercised its rights of co-determination, is not easy to reconcile and frequently comes perilously close to holding that potential exercise is sufficient (and consequently that liability of a parent with power to control is automatic).
Whatever solution is adopted, further clarification on the meaning of an economic unit from both the EU courts and the European Commission 139 would be most welcome. Any further light which could be shed on the core concepts and the principles underpinning them would be helpful to ascertain the breadth of the principle and, ultimately, how the boundaries of an undertaking are to be identified.
